Diabetic tight blood sugar control minimizes the likelihood of complications. This study focuses on quantifying education's role in explaining diabetic investment in health capital. Ability and information proxies are used to test whether education's positive effect on diabetic compliance is causal.
I. Introduction
Labor economists have found evidence that during the 1980s and 1990s, the returns to education have increased (Levy and Murnane 1992) . One hypothesis that might explain this fact is that the more educated have been better able to process new information and access new technologies such as computers (Krueger 1993 ). An extension of this argument is that the health returns to education may have also increased because people with high education levels have accessed new technologies and processed new scientific information about the benefits of health investments. This paper explores the health investment choices of different vintages of diabetics of different education levels. Thirteen million people have diabetes.
1 Diabetes is a chronic disease in which the body does not produce or respond to insulin. 2 Diabetic's choices over diet, exercise, blood sugar control, and smoking play a key role in determining the likelihood of suffering diabetic complications.
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Recent diabetic research has documented the value of tight blood sugar control in minimizing the are two major types of diabetes: insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus (IDDM also called type I) and non-insulin dependent diabetes mellitus (NIDDM, also called type II) (American Diabetic Association 1993) . NIDDM is much more common than IDDM (known as juvenile diabetes). Almost 98% of people older than 20 with diabetes have NIDDM. Diabetes therapy is geared toward controlling high blood glucose levels and preventing diabetes complications. For IDDM, treatment consists of insulin injections and diet/exercise therapy. For NIDDM, treatment may include insulin injections or oral agents to lower blood glucose, diet therapy, a weightreduction program for patients who are overweight, and a program of exercise. 2 Insulin is a hormone, produced by the pancreas, that helps the body metabolize the sugar glucose. When insulin is absent or ineffective, high levels of glucose appear in the blood. High blood glucose levels can lead to both short-term and long-term complications (American Diabetic Association 1993) . 3 In Kahn (1995) , I present an optimistic thesis that newer cohorts of diabetic should experience lower rates of complications because the "full price" of diabetic compliance with good health habits is falling. The "full price" of compliance depends on whether an individual is insured so that he faces a lower marginal cost of investing in self protection equipment, the physical cost of devoting effort to health maintenance, and how tasty are diet substitutes for their sugar counter-parts. likelihood of complications. 4 Education may play a key role in explaining cross-sectional variation in diabetic health choices. If diabetics with high levels of education are most likely to see doctors and to process this information and to value future utility (a low discount rate), then they will make larger behavioral changes than less educated people. Diabetic health inequality would grow over time if different demographic groups make larger lifestyle changes in response to new information.
This study focuses on quantifying diabetic health investment by education level in different calendar years. If the most educated are making larger investments, there are two major hypotheses that could explain this finding. One is that education raises one's learning ability and thus one is more productive at accessing new technologies and understanding new information about tight blood sugar control. A second theory is that education proxies for patience and that more patient people are more likely to be "health nuts".
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By studying education's role, I contribute to the health production literature. Following Grossman (1975) , Berger and Leigh (1989) and Kenkel (1991) , I explore education's impact on investment in health. My contribution is to study a specific subgroup (diabetics) who have an incentive to recognize that controlling their pre-existing condition requires certain investments that a non-diabetic may not need to make.
To study variation in diabetic health investment, I focus on several key inputs in the production of good health. This paper's empirical work focuses on explaining diabetic smoking, body mass index (bmi), diet control and blood sugar control as a function of education, IQ and information proxies. Smoking propensities are especially informative proxy for diabetic health investment. Diabetics should not smoke because variation 4 Drury (1984) reports that diabetics are about twice as likely relative to non-diabetics to report ever having cataracts, glaucoma, arteriosclerosis, hypertension, heart attacks, strokes, and kidney trouble. Diabetics are more likely than non-diabetics to be limited in their usual activities. Diabetes is the seventh leading cause of death in the United States and third largest killer of African Americans. in blood sugar levels damages blood vessels and smoking exacerbates such circulation problems. unique opportunity to study type one diabetic health investments. This study was designed to learn the benefits of tight blood sugar control through a control/treatment group comparison. At the randomization stage, 1441 type 1 diabetics were asked detailed health questions. The data reports their propensities to smoke, drink, exercise, and an indicator of their mean blood level over the last two months. This data set is divided into two groups; the "primary" and "secondary" groups. This distinction was made because the goal of the DCCT was to study whether tight blood sugar control had high health benefits for newly diagnosed diabetics and for 7
One might conjecture that access to these sources are normal goods. To test this, I estimated linear probability models to estimate the likelihood that a diabetic accessed each of these. The measure of income in the NHIS is family income. I found positive but quite small effects. On average a $10,000 increase in family income increased the probability that a diabetic accessed these sources by 2%. diabetics who had longer durations. The sample of diabetics were not a random sample of the universe of type one diabetics. To be admitted into the DCCT an applicant was required to not have severe complications.
9
Relevant for my work, each participant received a physical exam, was asked standard demographic questions, including their smoking propensities, and took an IQ test. Table One shows that the mean IQ was 113 which is a standard deviation above "normal". Given that the DCCT data consists of people under age 40,1 want to compare smoking propensities to a "control" group. The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLS Y) asked individuals questions about smoking propensities in its 1992 wave. I use this cross-section from this panel data set to compare smoking propensities.
III. Specifications and Findings
My empirical goal is to study education's role in diabetic health investment and to study how education's effect varies in different calendar years and whether its impact diminishes when one controls for information or ability proxies such as IQ. I proxy for health investment using individual smoking, propensity to follow a diet, blood sugar control and one's body mass index (bmi) which is weight standardized for height (weight in kilograms divided by the square of height in meters).
10 Each of these health decisions, to not smoke, to follow a diet and achieve tight blood sugar control represents a costly investment A more structural modeling approach would write down a lifetime dynamic expected utility model. To quality for the DCCT, a person had to be between the ages 13-40, have had IDDM for a duration of at least 1 year but less than 5 (group 1), and had absence of diabetic retinopathy or other ocular lesions, second group duration 1 to 15, minimal eye troubles, no hypertension. Also not allowed into the sample were very heavy people, or people with high blood pressure, high cholesterol, no alcoholics or drug abusers.
benefits of consumption. The higher a person discounts future utility or their greater unwillingness to tradeoff "tasty" food for future good health would lower their investment in these health inputs. A second relevant issue is cognitive dissonance and self control. A person could desire good health but not know how to achieve it or subconsciously suppress information that might aide in rational decision making (Thaler and Shefrin 1981, Akerlof and Dickens 1982) . A forward looking rational addiction model would predict that diabetics would be less likely to start smoking than non-diabetics because the former face a higher "long term" price as measured by increased health complications Murphy 1992, Becker, Grossman and Murphy 1994) .
Smoking Findings
Smoking is an important decision that reveals information about diabetics. Diabetic smoking rates were 29% and 21% respectively in 1976 and in 1989. Diabetics may not internalize the full cost of their actions if they do not perceive the health complications caused by the complementarities between their condition and smoking. This is especially likely to be true if the presence of a pre-existing condition is not randomly assigned in the population. If people with less "self control" are more likely to be diabetic and more likely to smoke, then they will need an extra incentive not to smoke than a random person in the society. In results that are available on request, I have estimated a bivariate probit model that a person smokes and is diabetic and found a statistically significant correlation of .6. This indicates that controlling for all observed demographic characteristics, the unobserved characteristics that increase one's probability of being a smoker also increase one's probability of being a diabetic.
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Table Two presents seven separate smoking propensity logits. Each column of Table Two reports a separate set of estimates. Holding age, diabetic duration, and sex constant, I study how smoking propensities n Graber et. al (1992) report additional evidence that diabetic smokers differ from the universe of diabetics. They report evidence that diabetic smokers were much more likely to quit outpatient treatment education programs than observationally identical diabetic non-smokers. This suggests that smoking proxies for a general unwillingness to make health investments. co-move with education. The left two columns of Table Two present the 1976 NHIS results split by diabetic status. For both groups, smoking propensities decrease with age. Interestingly for diabetics, smoking propensities do not decline with education but for non-diabetics they do decline.
In 1976, diabetics do reduce their smoking rates the longer they have had diabetes. If diabetic duration proxies for the depreciation of health capital, then this finding can be interpreted that diabetics increase their health investments as their health worsens. The middle columns of Table Two report the 1989 NHIS estimates. Unlike the 1976 estimates, I find that education's coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. This may be evidence of increased understanding by high educated diabetics of the risks of smoking. Table Two 's right two columns present the smoking propensities based on the DCCT data. For type 1 diabetics, the education coefficients are negative and statistically significant. Interestingly, controlling for education, IQ has a statistically significant negative impact on smoking. Dropping the IQ variable, in the right column, increases the coefficient on education slightly. Table Two's third column from the right presents the smoking results from the NLSY sample. It is reasonable to assume that less than 1 % of the NLSY are diabetics, thus this sample reveals the smoking propensities for a representative sample of young non-diabetics.
Although IQ is not measured, the NLSY does report each respondent's AFQT score which is often used as an ability proxy in the labor literature. In the NLSY logit, I find that education has a statistically significant negative effect on smoking even controlling for age, sex and the AFQT. Table Three simulates the smoking probabilities generated from the coefficient estimates in Table   Two . I simulate smoking probabilities for 35 year old men. For both diabetics and non-diabetics, smoking rates have fallen but they have fallen more for non-diabetics and non-diabetics had lower smoking rates in 1976. Smoking rates for diabetics with 12 years of education fell from 54% to 41% between 1976 and 1989.
For non-diabetic high school graduates, smoking rates fell from 48% to 34%. College graduate diabetics reduced their smoking rates from 58% to 38% while college graduate non-diabetics reduced their smoking rates from 40% to 24%.
Although both diabetics and non-diabetics reduce smoking as education increases, these simulations suggest that non-diabetics have a greater elasticity of not smoking with respect to education than do diabetics.
Given that diabetics face a greater health incentive to not smoke than non-diabetics, these results suggest that type 2 diabetics must have a stronger preference for smoking than non-diabetics. My findings suggest that a benevolent paternalistic government would have trouble reducing type 2 diabetic smoking. Education had no impact in 1976 and a relatively small effect in 1989. This suggests that public information campaigns would not be successful in reducing type 2 diabetic smoking. An alternative to information would be higher prices but the government cannot "two part price" smoking for diabetics.
Unlike for type 2 diabetics, I find larger education effects for type 1 diabetic based on the DCCT relative to the non-diabetic "control group" (the NLSY). Increasing a type 1 diabetic's education from 12 to 16 years reduces smoking propensities by 20 percentage points while this education increase reduces nondiabetic smoking rates as indicated in the NLSY data by 18 percentage points. For both the NLSY and DCCT samples, I find that increases in education not the IQ proxy leads to a larger reduction in smoking rates.
Interestingly, even for the type 1 diabetics the simulations indicate very high smoking rates among less educated diabetics. All diabetics have an incentive to not smoke but regardless of education level diabetics are smoking more than their non-diabetic counterparts.
Additional Evidence on Diabetic Education and Self Control
In addition to smoking rates, blood sugar control is another key determinant of diabetic health. The DCCT sample includes an A1C test. This test provides an indicator of the mean of diabetic blood sugar levels over the last two to three months. It is a crucial input in informing a diabetic's doctor about the degree of patient tight control over blood sugar.
12 Given that the diabetic's goal is to achieve tight blood sugar control,
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Even if the diabetic keeps detailed food and blood sugar monitoring records, the diabetic has private information about his "cheating". The A1C test reveals information about the diabetic's overall control over the time interval.
this is an indicator of whether the mean "is right". There is no test of the historical variance around the target. I estimate the A1C regression separately for the DCCT's "Secondary" and "Primary" samples. The Secondary sample have had type one diabetes longer and have experienced some complications. For this group, I find that people who are older, have had diabetes for a longer duration and have more educated have a statistically significantly lower A1C. This indicates that they have tighter control over their condition. Interestingly, IQ has the "wrong" sign and is statistically insignificant for this sample. For the "primary" sample, I find that education continues to increase the degree of tight control. Unlike the other sample, I find that the IQ variable is statistically significant at the 10% level. Its sign indicates that increased IQ increases blood sugar control.
The coefficient sizes indicate that 9 extra points of IQ or 1 more year of education have equal impacts on reducing the A1C score. I have dropped the IQ variable from the regressions and have that education's coefficient is robust.
13 Although education's coefficient is negative and statistically significant its magnitude is relatively small. The standard deviation for the A1C variable is 1.6 while the coefficient on an extra year of education is -.10.
A final interesting point is to relate A1C scores with smoking propensities. A self control model would posit that people who do a less good job controlling their diabetes are also more likely to smoke. Simply, on all margins they are investing less in their health. I find that for people with an A1C reading below the median only 16.8% smoke while for diabetics whose A1C is above the median the mean smoking rate is 25%.
Diabetic Health: Education vs. Information
The previous section documented that controlling for IQ does not diminish the impact of education on smoking rates. In this section, I study whether controlling for diabetic information proxies reduces the
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The raw correlation between IQ and education in my DCCT sample is .4.
impact of education on health input variables such as smoking and diet. I mimic a notable recent study by
Kenkel (1991). He uses the Health Promotion/Disease Prevention Supplement of the 1985 Health Interview
Survey to test for education's impact on health investment after controlling for health information. This data set quantifies the number of correct answers respondents gave linking behavior to health outcomes. Kenkel (1991) reports that controlling for this health knowledge, education continues to have a positive effect on health investment as indicating by smoking.
My information proxies are the dummy variables in the 1989 NHIS data that indicates the sources of diabetic information about disease control. I explore whether including information proxies lowers the impact of education on diabetic propensities to smoke, follow their diet, and bmi. Each column is estimated using OLS. Thus, the smoking and diet models are linear probability models. The dependent variable in the left two columns is a dummy variable that equals one if the diabetic is a smoker. The specifications are identical except that the first specification includes the 13 information dummies discussed in the data section. Each of these information proxies equals one if the diabetic reported it as a source of information about controlling the condition. The smoking results indicate that a visit with a nurse at a doctor's office reduces smoking propensities by 6.5 percentage points. I conduct an F-test on the joint significance of the information proxies and cannot reject the hypothesis that they are jointly equal to zero. Interestingly, the coefficient on education's impact on smoking does not change when information proxies are included but the coefficient is no longer statistically significant.
The middle two columns of Table Five report the results where bmi is the dependent variable. A larger bmi indicates a heavier person. It is reasonable to posit that increased information may lower bmi. For bmi, I find that diabetics who discuss their condition with a doctor (86% of the sample) have a lower bmi of .68.
Diabetics who receive information from the National Diabetic Information Clearinghouse (NDIC) have a bmi of 1.26 lower than observationally identical diabetics who do not. In the NHIS 1989 sample, the mean bmi is 25 with a standard deviation of 4.5. Thus, the information effects are relatively small. Similar to the smoking results, the information proxies are jointly insignificant. Increased education lowers diabetic bmi. A one year increase in education lowers bmi by .087 units. This estimate is just slightly lower than the education estimate without the information proxies. This indicates that including the information proxies does not diminish education's explanatory power but that the education coefficient is not that large.
Finally, the right columns of Table Five present the follow diet results. Again, I find that the information proxies are jointly insignificant but I do find that diabetics who visit a doctor increase their likelihood of following a diet by 5.8 percentage points. Interestingly, diabetics who had at least one diabetic parent have a two percentage point lower follow diet propensity and are likely to have a higher bmi. 14 Similar to my findings for smoking and bmi, I find that more educated diabetics are more likely to invest in health inputs. In the specification that includes information proxies, an extra year of schooling increases one's likelihood of following a diet by .0058 percentage points. In the specification that omits these information variables, an extra year of schooling increases this diet compliance by .0072 percentage points. Thus, I
conclude that the information proxies only weakly explain differential investment behavior and that they only slightly reduce the coefficient on education. Although education does increase a diabetic's propensity to follow a diet the absolute magnitude of the education coefficient is not large.
IV. Conclusion
This paper has focused on quantifying differential diabetic health investment by education levels. The paper's key finding is that education continues to have a positive impact on diabetic health investment even after controlling for IQ and available information. I presented evidence that the less educated are achieving lower levels of compliance. Based on the evidence presented in this paper on smoking, blood sugar control,
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A diabetic who had a diabetic parent might be better informed about the consequences of not being in control of the condition because they would have observed the complications suffered by their parent. Thus, the diabetic parent dummy might be interpreted as an information proxy. Alternatively, a diabetic parent might indicate a family fixed effect that this family has unobserved characteristics that make them more at risk to not follow a diet and be heavier. and body mass index, the more educated are achieving tighter control and this will lead to lower complication rates.
Whether this is socially optimal depends on whether less educated diabetics are informed about the full cost of their decisions to smoke and to not follow a diet. If increased education does raise one's ability to process information to control diabetes, then there may be a paternalistic role for the State in aiding less educated diabetics.
15
15 Ironically, recent research has argued that smoking taxes are too high. Viscusi (1994) makes an convincing case that the taxes are too high for the representative agent. If there is health consequence heterogeneity among smoker then a benevolent planner might want to two part price charging people with pre-existing conditions higher prices. Standard errors in (). For the NLSY sample, IQ is proxied using the AFQT test score. The DCCT sample are all type 1 diabetics. Note: Since the NLSY does not include an IQ score, the AFQT score is used as a proxy. For the simulation, the 35th percentile is equal to an IQ of 90, and the 65th percentile as an IQ of 110 and 95th percentile as an IQ of 140. indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level and ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. All regressions estimated with OLS. Thus, the smoking and following diet models are linear probability models.
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